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The Soft Power Practices of the Ming Dynasty 
and Zheng He’s First Voyage 
 
By Peter Weisser 
 
 
Abstract: This article will examine the soft power aspects of Zheng 
He’s life as well as the soft power efforts of the People’s Republic 
of China in the modern day, using Zheng He as an example to 
show the historical parallels between the two while examining the 
motivations of the PRC which is a search for legitimacy. This 
article will look into the parallels that exist between Zheng He and 
the soft power practiced in the fifteenth and twenty-first centuries 
within China. Furthermore, the perceptions and meanings of soft 
power in China may be different than that of other nations or other 
periods of time.1    
 
 
 
 
In the study of world politics today, there is a great deal of focus 
on the soft power aims of the People’s Republic of China. Soft 
power is defined as a persuasive approach to world politics, 
usually accomplished through diplomacy, with influences both 
political and cultural in aim. Joseph S. Nye, the academic who first 
                                                
1 The following article contains text and excerpts from my longer scholarly work 
“The Admiral ‘s Carrot and Stick” which was a long and complex study 
regarding the relationships between Soft Power as practiced by the Ming-era 
Admiral Zheng He and its relationship to the soft power practices of the modern 
PRC. This article is a shortened version which focuses exclusively on the first 
voyage of Zheng He and the soft power practices of the Ming Dynasty along 
with some modern-day examples of the PRC continuing a soft power policy that 
reaches all the way back to the early dynasties of China, with specific focus on 
the Ming. 
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coined the term, describes soft power as the “carrot and stick” 
approach to world politics.2  There is, however, a very common 
misconception that the PRC’s push for soft power is a recent affair. 
Indeed, China has been seen as a rising power in the last few 
decades but has taken a unique view of its own power as non-
hegemonic. From the point of view of the PRC, they are a non-
hegemonic power and claim that the amount of soft power that the 
PRC has gained in the last few decades has been a result of 
China’s peaceful rise. The perception of what soft power is, 
however, may differ from that of western nations. For example, 
soft power from the perspective of Beijing may include force so 
long as it's not military in nature. This is not to say however that 
“charm” does not have a role in Beijing’s usage of soft power; 
indeed the massive cultural influence that Beijing holds is quite 
considerable and is used in negotiations through cultural soft 
power.  
  In the last few years, the United States under the Trump 
administration has moved away from international cooperation and 
the possibility that Trump is ceding America’s global leadership 
role is becoming more apparent. As the United States seems to be 
pushing away from globalization, and as America has been willing 
to push away former allies and interests, China under President Xi 
Jinping has been more than willing to fill the void.  Historically, 
China has long considered the nineteenth century as its “century of 
humiliation” when colonial powers forced a series of unequal 
treaties during the two Opium Wars with Great Britain. In the first 
years of the twentieth century the anti-foreign Boxer Uprising 
aftermath also forced humiliating concessions on the waning Qing 
Dynasty. In 1911 they would fall from power leaving space for the 
Republic of China to take over. 
First, in 1927, the Nationalist movement arose, and later in 
1948, Mao Zedong’s Communists came into power, making the 
twentieth century a moment of upheaval in China’s history. 
                                                
2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics (New 
York: PublicAffairs), 5.  
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Beijing’s international relations today are often motivated by an 
urge to recapture the lost glory of the “Middle Kingdom” and 
through soft power methods China has found a way to accomplish 
this by finding ways to improve Beijing’s international image. 
While some scholars would refer to “soft power” as a collective 
term for Beijing’s motivations, there are problems with portraying 
these motivations as purely an issue of soft power versus hard 
power. What Beijing and the PRC’s perception of soft power is can 
be very different from that of the United States and the European 
Union, for example. Beijing’s perception of its soft power in some 
cases may blur the lines of the original concept of soft power as 
originally defined. In any case, it seems that the term soft power 
may be a problematic concept to give simple definitions to. It will 
be important to distinguish and unpack what soft power means, as 
well as discussing the problematic concept of soft power itself and 
critically examine if Beijing’s diplomatic practices can be 
considered soft power at all.                  
 The use of soft power in China’s history has hardly been a 
recent development. During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), 
Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433), a eunuch military commander and 
explorer, exercised soft power during the rule of Zhu Di, the 
Yongle Emperor (1402-1424) and third emperor of the Ming 
Dynasty. Zheng He traveled across the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean, along the way visiting numerous countries in an 
effort to show both the wealth and power of the Ming Dynasty, a 
charm offensive in its own right. In the modern day, author Joshua 
Kurlantzick noted that China’s soft power resembles that of a “lion 
and not a mouse.”3  This form of power may be different from 
traditional soft power in that it is used by authoritarian regimes as a 
form of coercing other countries viewpoints to the regimes point of 
view. According to The National Endowment for Democracy, a 
Washington based think-tank, this is defined as “sharp power.”   
                                                
3 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is 
Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 6.   
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 China has declared to the rest of the world on many 
occasions that it takes a path of peaceful development and is 
committed to upholding world peace and promoting common 
development and prosperity for all countries. At the beginning of 
the second decade of the twenty-first century and on the occasion 
of the ninetieth anniversary of the founding of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC), China declared solemnly again to the world 
that peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to 
realize modernization, make itself strong and prosperous, and 
make more contributions to the progress of human civilization. 
Going forward, China will unswervingly follow the path of 
peaceful development.   
This idea of cooperation and common development has 
been a crucial part of China’s recent success in diplomacy within 
the last decade. Rather than seeing China as an antagonist on the 
world stage, the PRC has allowed a more benevolent and non-
interventionist image of the country to be formed by its new state 
propaganda. This new view allows Beijing to wield its soft power 
in a way that creates an environment for former adversaries to 
become partners. Whether or not the Communist system of the 
PRC will survive going forward in its present form under the face 
of such pragmatism will also be something to consider in the 
coming decades. 
 
The Emperor and the Admiral: The Life and Adventures of 
Zheng He and its Impact on Soft Power Relations 
 
Before covering the specifics of Zheng He’s life, it would be 
prudent to present a basic overview of the early history of the Ming 
Dynasty (1368-1644), its first two emperors, and the rise of Zhu 
Di, the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty and Zheng He’s patron. 
By looking at these historical figures we will see the kind of world 
Zheng He lived in, and what the political realities were that he 
faced. The Ming Dynasty was the last ethnically Han dynasty in 
the history of China. The previous dynasty, the Yuan Dynasty 
(1271-1368) founded by Kublai Khan (1215-1294) was 
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overthrown in 1368 by Zhu Yuanzhang, the leader of the rebellion 
against the Yuan, who would come to be known as Ming Taizu 
(r.1368-1398) first emperor of the Ming Dynasty. Like many 
founders of previous dynasties, Taizu was of humble birth, but he 
was able to rally support against the hated Mongols. He succeeded 
in his civil war despite the odds, against the more militarily 
powerful Yuan.4 Once the Yuan Dynasty fell in 1368, Zhu 
Yuanzhang began to consolidate power in his new capital of 
Nanjing (Nanking) and began to build a state infrastructure. The 
Confucian scholars benefited the most from this new arrangement 
of power while the court eunuchs felt a decrease in power due to 
Zhu Yuanzhang’s distrust of them.5 Many of Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
closest friends and allies took up the position of commanders of 
Ming’s armies. But this arrangement would not last long. After the 
purges of 1380, many of the merit-based nobility in the empire 
were executed and Zhu Yuanzhang’s sons would remain as the 
most powerful military commanders in the empire, commanding 
vast armies from their fiefs. Zhu Yuanzhang’s government was, 
like many, autocratic and incredibly harsh in the face of rebellion. 
The Great Ming Code were the written laws of the Ming Dynasty 
and as seen from the following excerpt, the punishment for treason 
against the throne was harsh indeed, showing the considerable 
punishment any potential rebel would have:  
 
Rebellion, (that is plotting against the dynasty) and 
lese-majeste (that is plotting to desecrate imperial 
ancestral altars, mausoleums, and palaces). All 
conspirators regardless of whether they are leaders 
or followers shall be executed by slicing. Their 
grandfathers, fathers, sons, grandsons, older 
brothers, younger brothers, and those who live with 
them regardless of surname differences; sons of 
                                                
4 William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 
Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 779. 
5 Shin-Shan Henry Tsai, Eunuchs of The Ming Dynasty (Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 1996), 13. 
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paternal uncles and brothers regardless of whether 
they have the same registration; if they are sixteen 
years of age or over, regardless of serious or 
crippling disease, they shall be executed. Those 
fifteen or below, mothers, daughters, wives, and 
concubines older and younger sisters, sons’ wives 
and concubines, shall be given as slaves to the 
households of titular nobility. Their property shall 
be confiscated by the government…6   
   
The Origins of the Ming Dynasty 
 
The rise to power of Zhu Yuanzhang demonstrates the interplay 
between hard and soft power. Zhu Yuanzhang used the power of 
charm and persuasion when he was a peasant soldier rebelling 
against the Yuan Dynasty. Once Zhu Yuanzhang came to power 
however, he used coercion and strict autocratic policies to cement 
his rule. This is a common strategy throughout history with 
autocratic rulers who often play the liberator at first but become 
the tyrant once their power is achieved. Zhu Yuanzhang was very 
conscious of how he was able to overthrow the Yuan through 
popular rebellion and became increasingly paranoid that the same 
might be done to him. In 1380, he executed Chancellor Hu 
Weiyong on charges of conspiracy and forming a faction (a capital 
crime) and thereafter abolished the chancellery.7  In the wake of 
this event, Zhu Yuanzhang established the Jinyiwei (Embroidered 
Uniform Guard) as his secret police and they would assist 
considerably in helping Zhu Yuanzhang in the purges during his 
later reign.  
                                                
6 Da Ming Lu, “Great Ming Code,” as cited in William Theodore de Barry and 
Irene Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), 784. 
7 Edward L. Dryer, Zheng He and the Oceans of the Early Ming Dynasty (New 
York: Pearson Education), 17. 
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 Zhu Yuanzhong fathered twenty-six sons and sixteen 
daughters through the empress Ma and his numerous concubines.8  
One of these sons, Zhu Di (r.1402-1424) the future Yongle 
emperor, was born from Zhu Yuanzhang’s lesser consorts. Zhu Di 
would eventually become the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty 
but not until after winning a successful civil war that would not 
end until 1402 against his nephew Zhu Yunwen (1377-1402) the 
future Jianwen emperor, who would rule as the second emperor of 
the dynasty.    
   
The Early Life of Zheng He and Zhu Di’s Ascension 
 
In the aftermath of the toppling of the Yuan Dynasty in 1368, the 
Mongols and remnant Yuan forces retreated to Yunnan, with the 
newly created Ming Dynasty hot on their heels. In 1374, Zhu 
Yuanzhang demanded that the Mongols and their leader 
Basalawarmi submit to Ming rule and sent envoys to convey this 
message. The envoys were killed, and in response the Ming forces 
under General Fu Youde invaded Yunnan. Fu Youde’s 300,000 
strong army successfully invaded Yunnan and by 1382 had 
captured the provincial seat of Kunming after which the rebellion’s 
leaders committed suicide to avoid capture. Fu Youde then began a 
reign of terror against the local population, killing hundreds of 
thousands of Miao and Yao tribesmen.9 Another common method 
used against the population was the kidnapping of young boys to 
serve as eunuchs in the imperial court. One of these boys was a 
young ten-year-old child by the name of Ma He. Ma He’s surname 
Ma, according to Dryer, often but not always indicated Muslim 
faith.10 Also, according to Dryer, Ma He’s grandfather and father 
both had the name Haji indicating they had completed the Hajj, a 
pilgrimage to Mecca. While Ma He’s family were of Chinese 
                                                
8 Hok Lam Chan, “Ming Taizu’s Problem with His Sons: Prince Qin’s 
Criminality and Early-Ming Politics,” Asia Major 20, no.1 (2007): 45.    
9 Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the 
Dragon Throne, 1405-1433 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 57. 
10 Dryer, Zheng He, 22. 
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Muslim extraction, Ma He was known to mostly practice 
Buddhism in his religious life and took a Buddhist name.11  The 
boy was taken by Fu Youde and was subjected to castration. 
According to Levathes, in China during this time period castration 
was accomplished by the quick stroke of a knife that cut off both 
the penis and testes of the victim with a plug left in the urethra.12 
After this brutal act, Ma He was put into the household of the 
Prince of Yan, Zhu Di.  
Growing up in the Prince of Yan’s court, Ma He rose 
through the ranks to become an able military commander, one of 
the commanders during the siege of Beijing in 1399.13  Early in his 
life at court, Ma He befriended Zhu Di, and the young prince and 
the eunuch had become very close friends. Ma He served as a 
boyhood companion and later in life as a rising military general. 
These early skirmishes in Mongolia were formative years for Ma 
He and were crucial for him to receive the necessary training for a 
military career. Most importantly, the campaigns and hard fighting 
forged an ever-closer bond between Zhu Di and Ma He. These 
campaigns would also give Zhu Di’s troops an opportunity to “cut 
their teeth” in warfare. The veterans would prove crucial to the 
1399-1402 Ming Civil War, especially the Mongol defectors of the 
Uriyangqad tribe who fought for Zhu Di in the civil war.  In 
particular, a Mongol leader by the name of Nagahachu who 
surrendered to Zhu Di during his campaign against Inner 
Mongolia. Zhu Di treated Nagahachu and his men like honored 
guests and soon convinced them to join his forces. These expert 
horse-archers would prove to be a strategic asset in the civil war.14  
This consolidation of forces and military power showed that Zhu 
Di was thinking in the long term, indeed his chances of success in 
the beginning of the war was nowhere near as dramatic and 
climactic as the final siege of Nanjing in January 1402.  
                                                
11 Ibid., 5. 
12 Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 57. 
13	Ibid. 
14	Ibid., 124. 
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Zhu Di had left Beijing with his generals; among them 
were Ma He and Zhu Di’s new Uriyangqad allies. With the help of 
two defected commanders who agreed to open the gates, Zhu Di, 
Ma He and the rebel army marched through Nanjing’s Jinchuan 
gate on July 17, 1402. By the time Zhu Di had reached the 
Imperial palace, the Jianwen Emperor’s last loyal servants and 
guards had set the Imperial Palace ablaze. A charred corpse was 
presented to Zhu Di as the corpse of his nephew, but the corpse 
was so badly burned it could not be identified. According to the 
Comprehensive Mirror of the Ming Dynasty, a work written by 
Chinese historian Xia Xe, the Jianwen Emperor Zhu Yunwen very 
likely died in the conflagration, although there were rumors he had 
escaped, most famously as a monk, as cited by Leavthes.15   
Despite these rumors Zhu Di ascended to the Dragon 
Throne on the 17th of July as the Yongle (perpetual happiness) 
Emperor. Zhu Di, being an usurper was quick to find ways to give 
himself legitimacy and prove that the Mandate of Heaven had 
indeed been granted to him. However, the rumors of his nephew’s 
survival haunted him and so he almost immediately started 
financing searches for his possible whereabouts or conclusive 
evidence of his death.  Zhu Di’s eunuch general Ma He for his part 
also rose in stature due to his invaluable generalship during this 
campaign. Ma He was elevated by Zhu Di to the position of 
Taijian (Grand Director) of the Directorate of Palace Servants, one 
of the highest-ranking positions a Palace Eunuch could attain. This 
also allowed Ma He the right to wear the red robes of a high-
ranking Eunuch of the court, a symbol of his new status. In 1404 
on New Year’s Day in commemoration of Ma He’s defense of the 
Zheng Village Dike during the civil war, Zhu Di conferred upon 
Ma He the name of Zheng in honor of his role in this battle.   
 
The Practice of Ming Soft Power on Zheng He’s First Voyage 
 
                                                
15 Xia Xe, Comprehensive Mirror of the Ming Dynasty (Beijing: Zhonghua 
shuju, 1959), Chapter 14. 
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While Zhu Di now had full and absolute power as emperor, he was 
still in a very tenuous position. First of all, Zhu Di and the entire 
empire were painfully aware that he was an usurper. This was 
nothing new in the history of China, indeed the concept of the 
Mandate of Heaven, an ideal similar to the European “Divine 
Right of Kings” seemed to support it. The Mandate of Heaven was 
a concept started in the Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC–256 BC) that 
justified a ruler’s divine right of rule and the right of rebellion 
against an unjust ruler who would have lost the mandate in the 
eyes of the divine. The tricky part in this case was that the loss of 
the Mandate of Heaven usually applied to one dynasty 
overthrowing another, rather than a usurpation of the same 
dynasty, although Zhu Di was hardly alone in being the usurper of 
the same dynasty. The Mandate of Heaven in a more modern 
interpretation can be seen as analogous to popular public support 
of the ruling dynasty, the fact that the heavens had shown support 
by allowing the new Emperor to be victorious in a sense proved his 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Nevertheless, the possible 
survival of Zhu Yunwen, the Jianwen Emperor, disturbed and 
worried Zhu Di greatly. Not only were there rumors that he had 
escaped disguised as a monk, but there were other rumors that Zhu 
Yunwen had escaped overseas, plotting his return to China.16  
Regardless of whether this was true or not, Zhu Di was in 
desperate need to prove his rule as legitimate and there was no 
better way to gain legitimacy than to have it acknowledged by 
rulers of China’s neighbors. 
In 1403, still new on the throne, Zhu Di ordered the 
construction of the Treasure Fleet, a vast armada of war and trade 
ships that would sail around the Indian Ocean and collect tribute 
and acknowledgement of the Ming Dynasty’s superiority from 
China’s neighbors17 The military usage of this fleet and the threat 
of force in a hard power sense could not be denied, but Zhu Di’s 
plans intended a more diplomatic, soft power tone. These ships 
                                                
16 Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 88. 
17 Ibid., 98. 
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would display the vast wealth and power of the Ming and its new 
emperor, showing the benefits of token submission under the 
tribute trade system. The rumors of the Jianwen’s survival overseas 
indeed may have been a motivation for these journeys although 
according to Yang Wei, that was very unlikely as the cost of 
launching seven voyages because of a mere rumor would not have 
been very feasible.18   
In autumn 1405, after over a year of planning and 
construction Zheng He’s grand armada sailed out of Longjiang 
towards the state of Champa (Vietnam). While in Champa, Zheng 
He traded in Ming porcelain and silks. Moving on from Champa, 
the armada made its way to the island of Java. The Chinese and 
Javanese had endured difficult relations in the past, culminating in 
the 1377 execution of several Chinese envoys—sent by China in 
order to force the recognition of the state Palembang, a rival of the 
Javanese—by Javanese King Hayam Wuruk.19 This was, of course, 
an affront to the Dragon Throne, and trade as a result had dwindled 
to nothing; Zheng He was determined to reverse this. 
On his way to Java and Sumatra, Zheng He had avoided the 
state of Palembang, which out of all the city states was the 
wealthiest.20 Their wealth came as a result of a war between the 
Javanese city states who had claimed Palembang as their own and 
had installed a Javanese controlled puppet government in the city. 
The inhabitants of Palembang had thrown out the Javanese but 
during this time of upheaval, the notorious Chinese pirate Chen 
Zuyi took control of the city and made Palembang a stronghold of 
piracy and lawlessness, similar to the “Pirate Republic” of Nassau 
in the early eighteenth century during British rule in the Bahamas.  
On his return to China, Zheng He would deal with Chen Zuyi but 
the time was not quite right for a full military engagement, 
especially when Zheng He was trying to repair relations with the 
                                                
18 Yang Wei, “Admiral Zheng He’s Voyages to the “West Oceans,”” Education 
about Asia 19, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 1. 
19 Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 98. 
20 Ibid., 98. 
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Javanese, showing that at least for now, soft power diplomacy 
would win the day.21   
After spending some time in Java and Sumatra trading, the 
fleet moved on to the kingdom of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where 
Zheng He met with a much different reception than he did in Java, 
which was rather positive compared to that of Ceylon. Zheng He 
noted that the ruler of Ceylon, as cited by Dryer and Levathes, had 
treated him and the emperor’s emissaries badly and had proved 
“arrogant and disrespectful and wanted to harm Zheng He.”22 
Zheng He decided it would be best to leave Ceylon for the time 
being but made note of Ceylon’s military defenses and vast wealth 
in precious gemstones.  
According to Ma Huan, a Chinese Muslim scholar who 
participated in the voyages and a contemporary of both Zheng He 
and Fei Xin, Zheng He and the fleet made haste to their original 
destination of Calicut which the Chinese regarded as “The Great 
Country of the Western Ocean” showing the amount of prestige 
and admiration the Chinese held for this West Indian city state. Ma 
Huan described the people there as being “honest and trustworthy.” 
According to Levathes, Zheng He stayed in Calicut from 
December 1406 to April 1407.23 The unusual extended duration of 
this trade mission was due to the rituals and bargaining that was a 
standard part of an official trade mission sent by the emperor. 
Zheng He’s experience in Calicut was peaceful and he knew that 
by following a soft power policy he could gain a favorable trade 
relationship with Calicut, one of the busiest ports in all of Asia.  
From this port flowed goods from all over Asia, Europe and the 
Middle East. He also took great care to show respect to the 
Zamurin, the title of the ruler of Calicut.24 
 In April the fleet began its return journey to China. Coming 
along with Zheng He were ambassadors from Calicut, Java and 
Sumatra who were to be taken to the imperial court to submit 
                                                
21 Wei, “Admiral Zheng He,” 28. 
22 Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas, 100. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 100-101. 
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themselves to Zhu Di, a time-honored ritual in Imperial China.  
Emissaries would prostrate themselves before the emperor in 
submission, and in return the emperor would reward them with 
rich gifts and treat them as guests of extreme honor. But there was 
one further amount of business that had to be taken care of—the 
pirate Chen Zuyi. Here Zheng He abandoned his soft power policy 
and turned the wrath of the Ming Navy onto Chen Zuyi. Zheng He 
utterly destroyed the pirates and burned their hideout in 
Palembang, both freeing the people of Palembang from Chen 
Zuyi’s rule and capturing alive the pirate. Chen Zuyi was bound in 
chains and was to be taken with Zheng He to Nanjing to face 
execution for his crimes.25 Fei Xin one of Zheng He’s officers also 
gives a firsthand account on the capture of the infamous pirate: 
 
In the third year of Yung-lo (1405) when Emperor 
Tai-tsung Wen huang-ti (Zhu Di) of our present 
dynasty ordered the principal envoy, the Grand 
Eunuch Cheng Ho, and others to take supreme 
command of a fleet and to precede to all the foreign 
countries, the pirate Chen Tsu-I and his followers 
met in the country of Srivijaya where they 
plundered foreign merchants and even attacked our 
ships. [But] they became victims of a secret plan on 
the part of our principal envoy, and like brutes 
caught in a net, they were exterminated, their 
leaders being captured alive and sent as prisoners to 
the imperial palace. After this the seas were restored 
to imperial peace and order.26 
 
The capture of the pirate Chen, as shown in this excerpt, 
demonstrates that while Zheng He was willing to mostly focus on a 
soft power strategy, he was not afraid to use hard power while 
carrying out Zhu DI’s foreign policy objectives. From a soft power 
                                                
25 Wei, “Admiral Zheng He,” 28. 
26 Fei Xin, The Overall Survey of the Star Raft, trans. J.V.G. Mills (Otto 
Harrassowitz, 1996), 53. 
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standpoint, this approach also worked by emptying the sea territory 
of Chinese pirates; a considerable boon to China’s neighbors, not 
to mention a removing the significant embarrassment to the Ming 
Dynasty that these pirates were. 
 In the summer of 1407, the fleet had returned to China and 
Zheng He returned to a very pleased emperor. Although distraught 
that no word had been heard about his predecessor, Zhu Di was 
still very pleased that the legitimacy of his rule had been 
recognized by many rulers in southeast Asia and India. Overall, 
this first expedition had shown that Zheng He had a great grasp on 
both soft power and hard power. He re-established trade 
relationships using the awe and majesty of the Treasure Fleet, 
relationships that were in great disrepair for over thirty years. He 
also made quick work of a notorious Chinese pirate that was 
affecting trade relationships around the area. Ceylon had proved to 
be problematic in establishing relations, but they could be dealt 
with in the future, as Zheng He would later prove.  
 
Zheng He and the Modern Day 
 
The journeys to Java and Calicut have had lasting impacts on the 
relations between China, India and Java today. A crucial part of 
China’s soft power is using its past to establish that China’s 
relations were peaceful and prosperous with its neighbors for 
centuries, especially when it comes to Zheng He, who has served 
as a useful bit of propaganda in the last few decades. In May 2005, 
the Nanjing Museum and many numerous cities in China, Java and 
India celebrated Zheng He’s sexcentenary, celebrating 600 years 
since the first voyage of the admiral. The China Heritage Quarterly 
gives a brief summarization of the celebrations: 
 
This tribute to Zheng He, master mariner of the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644), is merely one frisson in 
the flurry of activities organized for the 
sexcentenary. Stamped with patriotism, most events 
are designed to appeal to Chinese who hail from the 
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various hometowns and localities in China 
associated with Zheng He, or who now live in the 
areas of Southeast and South Asia, as well as the 
Middle East and even East Africa, once visited by 
Zheng He's fleets. Although Zheng He came to be 
deified and included in local Chinese pantheons in 
Tian Hou temples, he was in fact a Muslim, a fact 
not overlooked in the present celebrations.27 
 
Beijing has found a great propaganda spokesman in the Ming 
admiral. The PRC has recently been using Zheng He in its relations 
with the Javanese and India as a way to promote the “peaceful co-
existence” between nations that have had long standing relations 
with China. However, there have been some pitfalls in the 
relationship between the PRC and Java. In Tuban, a part of East 
Java, a 30.4-meter-tall statue of Guan Yu a famous Chinese 
general of the Three Kingdoms Era (220-280 BC) who was later 
deified was unveiled, sparking massive controversy with a 
fundamentalist minority of Tuban’s Muslim population. In the 
Straits Times the events and controversy are summarized:   
 
Indonesia has urged officials to stand up to mob 
pressure after Muslim and nationalist protesters 
called for a 30 m-tall statue of a Chinese deity 
erected in a temple complex in an East Java town to 
be torn down. The brightly painted statue of Guan 
Yu, a general who is worshipped by some Chinese 
people, was inaugurated last month in a temple 
complex in the fishing town of Tuban, and is 
claimed to be South-east Asia's tallest 
representation of the deity. The statue in Tuban, 
                                                
27 China Heritage Project, “Shipping News: Zheng He’s Sexcentenary,” China 
Heritage Quarterly no. 2 (June 2005), 
http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/articles.php?searchterm=002_zhenghe.in
c&issue=002. 
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about 100 km west of the city of Surabaya, has been 
partially covered up after the protests, provoking 
both praise and ridicule on social media in the 
world's most populous Muslim- majority country 
Teten Masduki, chief of staff to President Joko 
Widodo, told reporters: "If they ask for the statue to 
be torn down, the authorities cannot bow to such 
pressure. “Protesters demonstrated this week 
outside Surabaya's Parliament against the statue, 
some wearing paramilitary-style outfits and waving 
placards that read "Demolish it" and "We are not 
worshippers of idols”. Allowing a depiction of a 
foreign general was "a symbol of treason to this 
nation", an unnamed protester said in a video of the 
rally on news portal Kompas.com. Officials of the 
Kwan Sing Bio Temple in Tuban declined to 
comment, but the media have quoted residents as 
saying the statue was good for tourism.28 
 
While China’s perception of its soft power is a perception that 
celebrates peaceful exploration and relations, that perception may 
not always be shared with the nations China is attempting to woo. 
In the example shown in East Java concerning the Guan Yu statue, 
what China may see as sharing its culture, some Javanese natives 
may see as China’s perception of its own soft power as being a 
kind of cultural imperialism. There is also a perception by an 
extreme religious minority that the statue serves as an insult to the 
Muslim populations’ religious beliefs tinged with Indonesian 
nationalism clashing with Chinese nationalism. When it comes to 
Zheng He, there is perhaps a bit of irony in this point of view 
seeing that Zheng He was born to a Muslim father and there is 
considerable evidence he may have shared his father’s beliefs at 
least on a cultural level. The overall point that is being established 
                                                
28 “Tension in East Java over statue of deity,” Straits Times, August 12, 2017, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/tension-in-east-java-over-statue-of-
deity. 
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here however, is that China’s own perceptions of its history and 
soft power may at many times clash with what other nations and 
peoples consider Chinese soft (and hard) power to be. Quite likely 
in the case of the Guan Yu statue, religious belief may be used as 
an excuse and the real problem lies with nationalism, as implied in 
the article.  
 A large component of Chinese soft power practices is the 
idea of “legitimacy,” the legitimacy that is perceived by members 
of the PRC government to have been lost in the nineteenth century 
and has only started to be regained in the waning years of the 
twentieth century.  One of the main ideas of this paper is also that 
there is an explicit link between the ideas of Ming glory, non-
hegemonic expansion and the Confucius Institute. A common 
claim made by the PRC regarding the foreign policy of China is 
that both historically and today China remains a non-hegemonic 
power with the peacefulness of its rise being touted by its 
leadership, which makes an implied claim that China’s rivals—like 
the United States—do not follow a similar policy.  
The distrust of China’s motivations has also been a source of 
contention when it comes to national territory as well. The 
Senkaku and Diayou islands, dispute between China, Japan and 
Korea has shown that China is willing to forego soft power 
diplomacy when it comes to territorial integrity. From the forward 
to a white paper published by the PRC State Council in 2012, we 
can see how seriously China considers territorial integrity to be to 
its foreign policy. 
Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part 
of the Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China's inherent territory in 
all historical, geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys 
indisputable sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao. Japan’s occupation of 
Diaoyu Dao during the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 is illegal and 
invalid. After World War II, Diaoyu Dao was returned to China in 
accordance with such international legal documents as the Cairo 
Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. No matter what 
unilateral step Japan takes over Diaoyu Dao, it will not change the 
fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China. For quite some time, Japan 
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has repeatedly stirred up troubles on the issue of Diaoyu Dao. On 
September 10, 2012, the Japanese government announced the 
"purchase" of Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated Nanxiao Dao and 
Beixiao Dao and the implementation of the so-called 
"nationalization". This is a move that grossly violates China's 
territorial sovereignty and international jurisprudence. 
 
China is firmly opposed to Japan's violation of 
China's sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao in whatever 
form and has taken resolute measures to curb any 
such act. China's position on the issue of Diaoyu 
Dao is clear-cut and consistent. China's will to 
defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
is firm and its resolve to uphold the outcomes of the 
World Anti-Fascist War will not be shaken by any 
force.29 
 
Notice the terms “inseparable” and “inherent territory” in the 
language of this white paper. These concepts lend credence to the 
idea that past humiliations in losing territory to European powers 
in the nineteenth century shape China’s national and foreign 
policy. The idea of China being “inseparable” has long been a 
roadblock in finalizing territorial borders between China and her 
neighbors. Therefore, the concerns of nationalists in Indonesia 
doesn’t necessarily come from nowhere, or out of just pure 
nationalism and jingoism. There is a perceived fear of losing 
territory and cultural influence though both traditional and cultural 
imperialism, either from the aspect of territory as can be seen in 
the Senkaku island dispute or through cultural imperialism as seen 
through the incident involving the Guan Yu statue. As China’s soft 
power increases, there will be blowback about what is seen as 
China encroaching on the culture of others. This is something 
which can fuel conspiracy theories like one popular one amongst 
                                                
29 PRC Government, PRC State Council, “Diaoyu Dao 钓鱼岛, An Inherent 
Territory of China,” (Beijing: PRC State Council Information Office, 2012), 1. 
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certain nationalists in Indonesia, claiming that China’s government 
is secretly in control of the entire Indonesian government, and that 
these soft power efforts are examples of China imposing its culture 
on an unwilling population, threatening cultural sovereignty.  
The United States Congressional Research Service 
published a white paper in December 2015 summarizing many of 
these issues of sovereignty and territory. Titled “Maritime 
Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone Disputes Involving 
China” the white paper asserts that China is using the so-called 
“nine-dash line,” a vaguely located line of demarcation that the 
PRC asserts marks its territorial waters.30 The white paper asserts 
that China is using a “’salami-slicing’ strategy that employs a 
series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus 
belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor” in the 
words of the report. China in many of these contexts may not even 
be following a full soft power strategy but may in some instances 
be following a “Sharp Power” strategy. Sharp power is distinct 
from soft power in that it focuses on distraction and manipulation. 
Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig writing for Foreign Affairs 
gives a concise definition of the term: 
 
Contrary to some of the prevailing analysis, the 
influence wielded by Beijing and Moscow through 
initiatives in the spheres of media, culture, think 
tanks, and academia is not a “charm offensive,” as 
the author Joshua Kurlantzick termed it in his book 
Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is 
Defining the World.  Nor is it an effort to “share 
alternative ideas” or “broaden the debate,” as the 
editorial leadership at the Russian and Chinese state 
information outlets suggest about themselves. It is 
not principally about attraction or even persuasion; 
instead, it centers on distraction and manipulation. 
                                                
30	Ronald O’ Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone 
Disputes Involving China (Washington DC: United States Congressional 
Research Service, 2015), 1. 
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These powerful and ambitious authoritarian 
regimes, which systematically suppress political 
pluralism and free expression to maintain power at 
home, are increasingly applying the same principles 
internationally.31 
 
This new display of “sharp power” may add a third dynamic to 
international power play. Since it is neither hard nor soft power, 
sharp power is hard to give a concise category to, but with recent 
electoral events in the United States and elsewhere in the last few 
years it cannot be denied that creating manipulation and causing 
divisiveness in a country’s population has been an effective 
strategy. If China is indeed being more aggressive in its territorial 
ambitions, this may give credence to the “sharp power” theory in 
that while China is using soft power to increase its territorial 
sovereignty, it is still using elements of coercion and flexing of 
military muscle to achieve that end. 
 
 
  
                                                
31 Christopher Walker and Jessica Lang, “The Meaning of Sharp Power,” 
Foreign Policy, November 16, 2017. 
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